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FROM ISLAMIC REFORM TO MUSLIM ACTIVISM: THE 





Models explaining Islamist politics in Kenya examine an interplay of socio-economic conditions 
and psychosocial factors, but rarely account for the evolution of an Islamist ideology in Kenya’s 
public discourse. This article traces Islamist ideas within a longer history of Muslim politics. 
Specifically, the origins of Islamist ideas are placed within internal debates amongst the minority 
Muslim population of Kenya – and debates between Muslims and the state and Muslims and the 
wider Christian public – regarding how to improve the Muslim condition in a Christian-dominated 
country. The immediate background for the emergence of Islamist ideas is then discussed through 
an examination of trends since the 1990s: increased contestations of religious and political 
authority, and responses to Muslim activism by the state and the wider Christian public. The article 
concludes that Islamist politics – in Kenya and elsewhere – are more often than not a result of local 
histories as much as they are part of a global Muslim ‘victimization’ narrative. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Since late 2011, Kenya has been attacked by Somalia based Islamist organization, Harakat al-
Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, most commonly known as Al-Shabaab, ostensibly for retaliation of its 
contribution of forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).2 Evidence has shown 
that some Kenyan nationals are mobilizing support for this kind of Islamist violence, including 
recruiting their co-nationals to join Al-Shabaab and other Islamist organisations, and as a result, 
perpetrating most of the violence associated with the group within Kenya’s borders.3 Given this 
                                                          
Ngala Chome (killian.n.chome@durham.ac.uk) is a PhD candidate in History at Durham 
University, UK. Field research for this article was supported by the United States Institute of Peace, 
in collaboration with Sahan Research and International Alert. Previous versions of the article were 
presented at the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, and the African Studies 
Centre, Oxford University, UK. The author would like to thank Jumwa Gandi for her excellent 
research assistance, and Hassan Mwakimako, James Khalil, David Anderson, Justin Willis and 
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of the article.   
2 David Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa’, African Affairs 
114, 454 (2014), pp. 1-27.   
3 United Nations, ‘Letter dated 18 July 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to 
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security 
Council’ (UN report, New York, U.S, 2011), pp. 135-179.  
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background – of Kenyans participating in Islamist violence – what explains an increased 
invocation in Kenya’s recent history of an Islamist ideology in the country’s public discourse?   
  Studies on the politics of Kenya’s minority Muslim population have analyzed – at great length – 
the debates around participation and citizenship that Kenyan Muslims have engaged amongst 
themselves and with the state since the colonial decades.4 While these studies make only passing 
reference to Islamist politics, those that do not focus their attention on state responses to Islamist 
violence at one level, and the role of a narrative of Muslim marginalization in driving Islamist 
violence on another.5  
  The limitations of this literature – given the fact that many who are affected by marginalization 
do not, in fact, resort to violence, and that it is often unclear that those among them who do are 
motivated primarily by this condition – have been noted by an emerging field of study that 
examines an interplay of socio-economic conditions and psychosocial factors.6 In this field, which 
is associated with a newly-established broad programme for policy intervention commonly 
referred to as ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE), the conclusion is that socioeconomic 
conditions, such as the exclusion of Muslim interests, may provide substantial explanations for 
support for Islamist violence in any given location, but that there is also a very strong case that 
they can only poorly explain behaviours that contribute to such violence.7  
  These studies notwithstanding, few account for the increased invocation of Islamist ideas in 
Kenya’s public discourse in the recent past. This article outlines the historical evolution of Islamist 
ideas by drawing upon studies that place Islamism within a wider history of Muslim politics, i.e. 
the history of religious reform and the modernization of Muslim public life, including struggles to 
                                                          
4 Hassan Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan politics: political involvement, marginalization, and minority status 
(Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 2014); Mohamed Bakari, ‘A place at the table: the political integration of 
Muslims in Kenya, 1963-2007’, Islamic Africa 4, 1 (2013), pp. 15-48; Kai Kresse, ‘Muslim politics in post-colonial 
Kenya: negotiating knowledge on the double periphery’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15, 1 (2009), 
pp. 76-94; Arye Oded, Islam and politics in Kenya (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2000); Mohamed Bakari and 
Saad Yahya (eds), Islam in Kenya: proceedings of the national seminar on contemporary Islam in Kenya (MEWA, 
Mombasa, 1995), pp. 168-193; Abdulaziz Lodhi, ‘Muslims in eastern Africa: their past and present’, Nordic Journal 
of African Studies, 31, 1 (1994), pp. 88-98; Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, Symbolic confrontations: Muslims imagining 
the state in Africa (Hurst, London, 2003).        
5 Peter Kagwanja, ‘Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: new security frontiers, old strategies’, African Security 
Review 15, 3 (2006), pp. 72-86; Jeremy Prestholdt, ‘Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism, Africa Today 57, 
4 (2011), pp. 3-27; David Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Understanding Al-Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in 
Kenya,’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, 3 (2015), 536-557; Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom, 
‘Killing a mosquito with a hammer:  Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya, Peacebuilding 5, 2 
(2017), pp. 118-135.    
6 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, Guide to drivers of violent extremism, (United States Agency for International 
Development, Washington D.C, February, 2009); Anneli Botha, ‘Political socialization and terrorist radicalization 
among individuals who joined Al-Shabaab in Kenya’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37, 11 (2014), pp. 895-919; 
Anneli Botha, Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda; radicalization from a political socialization perspective, (Lexington, 
London, 2017).    
7 James Khalil, ‘Radical beliefs and violent actions are not synonymous: how to place the key disjuncture between 
attitudes and behaviours at the heart of our research into political violence’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, 2 
(2014), pp. 204-206; James Khalil and Martine Zuethen, ‘Countering violent extremism and risk reduction: a guide to 
program design and evaluation, (RUSI Whitehall Report, Royal United Services Institute, London, 2016).   
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articulate a common political agenda for Kenya’s minority population of Muslims.8 While the 
article pays attention to historical debates within the Muslim population of Kenya regarding how 
to address the Muslim condition, it locates the increased invocation of Islamist ideas in public 
discourse from wider trends since the 1990s, i.e. increased contestations of religious and political 
authority, and responses to Muslim activism by the state and the wider Christian public.  
  The historical and qualitative methodological approach involved key informant interviews and 
focused group discussions (FGDs). Respondents – selected for the purposes of two separate, but 
related studies – were drawn from neighborhoods and counties that, after a synthesis of media, 
government, and civil society reports, were determined to have had greater experiences with 
Islamist mobilization in the recent past. The interviews and FGDs – involving religious leaders 
and clerics, village elders, women and youth activists, administration officials, officials of county 
governments, local politicians, and academics – were conducted in Mombasa and Nairobi during 
the months of September and November 2015, and in Northeast Kenya (Garisa, Wajir and 
Mandera) in April 2016. The selection process was based on purposive sampling, where 
respondents with a direct or indirect experience of Islamist mobilization, state responses to Islamist 
mobilization, and involvement in community activism, were selected. In total, 120 semi-qualitative 
interviews were conducted in Mombasa and Nairobi, and an additional 25 in Northeast Kenya. 
While the names of participants are anonymized, some, like administration and county government 
officials, represented state perspectives, whilst others were closely aligned with Kenya’s Muslim 
and Christian population. This empirical data was triangulated with secondary literature, including 
existing academic literature, newspaper, government, and non-governmental reports.     
  The next section provides a framework for understanding Islamist ideas within wider trends in 
Muslim politics, while the second discusses Muslim politics in Kenya before 1990, with a focus 
on Muslim internal debates about reform and modernization. The third and fourth sections of the 
article each discuss the specific trends since the 1990s that occasioned an increased invocation of 
Islamist ideas in public discourse. The article ends with a few concluding remarks.  
Muslim politics and the emergence of Islamist ideas 
Following Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim politics are understood here to ‘constitute 
the field upon which an intricate pattern of cooperation and contest over form, practice, and 
interpretation takes place’.9 In this way, the distinct character of Muslim politics – as many 
scholars of the Islamic intellectual tradition would contend – is the constitution of a discursive 
field where ideas about proper religious practice are constantly debated, negotiated, or mediated 
                                                          
8 Hassan Mwakimako and Justin Willis, Islam, politics and violence on the Kenya coast, (Observatoire des Enjeux 
Politiques et Securitaires das la Corne de l’Afrique, Bourdieu, 2014) ; Gregory Deacon, George Gona, Hassan 
Mwakimako, and Justin Willis, ‘Preaching politics : Islam and Christianity on the Kenya coast’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 35, 2 (2017), pp. 148-167.  
9 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 1996).   
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according to specific geographical and historical contexts.10 In the same lines as those suggested 
by Eickelman and Piscatori, Fazlur Rahman has argued that the advent of Islamist ideas was 
occasioned by contending visions amongst Muslims regarding how to develop a distinctively 
modernist Muslim civil politics, especially after the dissolution of the Caliphate of Constantinople 
in 1924, which had symbolized the union of Islamic belief and politics for a number of centuries.11 
In a nutshell, ‘Islamism’ involves the wide range of attempts – violent and non-violent – that seek 
a revival of Islam’s political legacy.12 In this way, the central assumption driving Islamist politics 
is that the restoration of the Islamic state would serve as a ‘cure for all’ solution to what some 
regard as improper Islamic religious practice, or bida’, and through which the commonly felt 
global sense of Muslim powerlessness would be addressed.13  
  These approaches, therefore, suggest that Islamists seek to articulate a political vision, but also, 
are driven by the need to reform Islamic practice, i.e. by rejecting syncretism, or Islamic 
innovation. While some Islamists have attempted to advance their political vision through modern 
instruments such as the formation of political parties, participating in elections and joining modern 
governments, a seemingly minority group of Islamists has rejected secularization, nationalism and 
socialism, and has pursued an anti-democratic, anti-Western, and more often than not, violent 
strategy so as to restore an Islamic state.14 In addition, the discursive commitment of the latter to 
Sharia and other classical Islamic traditions is related to their strong allegiance to takfiri, i.e. the 
authority to declare other Muslims as ‘non-believing’, or ‘non-Muslims’ – an authority that many 
Muslims contend can only be claimed by God – and therefore designating them as targets of ‘holy 
war’.15 These Islamists – the subjects of this article – are committed to a conservative literalism, 
i.e. following classical Islamic texts without modification, and are opposed to the idea of self-
judgement (ijtihad).16 This ideology finds origin in influential strands of Islamic political thought 
during the twentieth century, i.e. in the early ideas of the Egyptian Muslim brothers, and in 
particular, those of Abu al-A’la Mawdoodi (1903-1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966).17   
                                                          
10 Talal Asad, The idea of an anthropology of Islam (Occasional paper series, Center for contemporary Arab studies, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, 1986); Muhammad Kassim Zaman, The Ulama in contemporary Islam: 
custodians of change (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 2002); Armando Salvatore, Islam and the political 
discourse of modernity (Ithaca Press, Reading, New Edition, 1999).      
11 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and modernity: transformation of an intellectual tradition (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1982).  
12 Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz, ‘Radical Islamism and totalitarian ideology: a comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s 
Islamism with Marxism and national socialism,’ Totalitarian movements and political religions 8, 1, (2007), pp. 55-
76.    
13 Robert Woltering, ‘The roots of Islamist popularity,’ Third World Quarterly 23, 6 (2002), pp. 1134-1136; Mehdi 
Mozaffari, ‘What is Islamism? History and definition of a concept,’ Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 
8, 1 (2007), pp. 17-33.     
14  Hansen and Peter Kainz, ‘Radical Islamism’, p. 56.  
15 Jeffrey Bale, ‘Islamism and totalitarianism’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, 2, (2009), pp. 73-
96; Alex de Waal (Ed.), Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa, (Hurst, London, 2004). 
16 de Waal (Ed.), Islamism, p. 5.  
17 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic political thought (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1982); John Calvert, 
Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism (Hurst, London, 2010).  
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  Similar to Muslims elsewhere, Muslims in Kenya have engaged with global Islamic discourses 
as a way of talking about Islamic reform, but to also wind ideas about reform (or debates about 
proper religious practice) together with wider political agendas.18 Indeed, Kenyan Islamic practice, 
which is predominantly Sunni with a Shafi intellectual tradition, consists of a number of varying 
interpretations, especially a form of Islam with a longer history that consists of a bundle of 
syncretic religious practices widely referred to as Sufi, and newer forms of reformist Islam 
commonly referred to as Wahhabist (or Salafist) that are opposed to Sufi practices.19 In this way, 
Muslim politics in Kenya revolves around struggles to rid Islamic practice of Sufi innovation, and 
to wind these ideas with wider political and social reform agendas, especially, the articulation of a 
common agenda for the country’s minority Muslim population.20  
  The context under which these struggles have evolved over time has been provided by a wider 
democratisation of claims to Islamic knowledge – where more individuals, not just traditional 
religious scholars, have come to have a say on how to be a Muslim and live a good life – and the 
wider ramifications of the advance of Western culture, which is perceived to have expanded at the 
expense of Islamic civilizations.21 Important to note is that the diverse (and increasingly political) 
invocations of Islam, not only by religious scholars, clerics and preachers, but also by Muslim 
professionals, students, activists, women, and disenfranchised youth – all in an effort to contribute 
to civic debate and public life – have complicated wider agendas that seek a unification of the 
minority Muslim population of Kenya.22 While this feature may derive from the diversity of 
Kenya’s population of Muslims along ethnic, race, class and geographical lines, it is also the result 
of Islam’s propensity to ‘lend itself to multiple interpretations’.23  
  As a result, as many Muslims encourage Muslim participation in the formal political process, 
others have rejected the modern state, elections and democracy, claiming that, in addition to 
providing the means through which Muslim marginalization has been forged, these processes and 
institutions are also un-Islamic.24 In other words, while some Muslims present Muslim concerns 
as synonymous with broader agendas of human rights and democracy, others have drawn parallels 
between Kenyan Muslim grievances and wider global narratives of Muslim persecution, locating 
the solution to Muslim grievances in Islamist strategies that seek an overthrow of the current 
international system. While these differences in Muslim public opinion have (since the 1990s) 
been hardened by responses to Muslim activism by the state and the wider Christian public, it is 
this article’s basic premise that they grew out of internal debates amongst the minority Muslim 
                                                          
18 Mwakimako and Willis, Islam, politics and violence’. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Kresse, ‘Muslim politics’.  
21 Zaman, The Ulama.  
22 Hassan Mwakimako and Justin Willis, ‘Islam and democracy: debating electoral involvement on the Kenya coast’, 
Islamic Africa 7, 1 (2015), pp. 19-43. 
23 John Esposito and James Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’ Middle East Journal 45, 3 (1991), pp. 427-440.  
24 Mwakimako and Willis, ‘Islam and democracy’, p. 30.   
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population regarding Islamic reform and modernization, or struggles to create the right conditions 
for the minority Muslim population of Kenya.  
 
Muslim politics in Kenya before 1990   
The predominance of the Shafi intellectual school in Kenyan Islam (through which Sufi practices 
have been anchored), is the result of the work of Islamic proselytizers from the Hadhramaut region 
of modern-day Southern Yemen – they migrated across East Africa and its offshore islands, 
especially during the 19th century, Islamizing significant parts of the hinterland of what became 
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and parts of Central Africa.25 These Sufi-Shafi scholars 
and preachers (most claimed status as direct descendants of the Prophet Muhhamad) used their 
social status to establish an early system of Quranic schools and mosques where they taught Islam 
through a pedagogy of recitation, repetition, and memorization.26 A series of rituals, like the 
celebration of the prophet’s birthday, communal prayer processions to offer protection from ‘evil 
spirits’, and veneration of men claiming to be descendants of the prophet, grew around a system 
that entrenched the role of the Shafi clerics (or ‘local saints’) as mediators between East African 
Muslims and Islamic knowledge and practice.27  
  These traditional religious scholars provided an uncontested Muslim leadership in Kenya for a 
considerable period of time, however, challenges to their hegemony have been issued, beginning 
in the 1920s and 1930s, albeit with varying degrees of success. Initially, challenges to the authority 
of traditional Shafi-Sufi scholars emanated from wider Muslim reactions to the threat of colonial 
rule to Islamic culture, which took on a form of religious renewal that begun placing greater 
emphasis on the basic tenets of Islam and the figure of the prophet. Sheikh Al-Amin Ali Mazrui 
(1891-1947) of Mombasa was the first prominent Muslim who sought a reformation of existing 
Islamic practices in Kenya, and rejected popular traditions that had become associated with the 
local brand of Islam.28 His intellectual campaign – published through weekly newsletters circulated 
in Mombasa in the 1920s and 1930s – was an attempt to provide the responses for East African 
Muslims to follow under the context of the advance of Western culture.29  
  Similar to Islamic reformers in other parts of the Muslim world, Sheikh Mazrui sought a return 
to the roots of Islam for guidance, and the application of the Islamic concept of self-judgement, or 
                                                          
25 Randall Pouwels, Horn and Crescent: cultural change and traditional Islam on the East African coast (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987).   
26 Mohamed Bakari, ‘The new Ulama in Kenya’, in Mohamed Bakari and Saad Yahya (eds), Islam in Kenya: 
proceedings of the national seminar on contemporary Islam in Kenya (MEWA, Mombasa, 1995), pp. 168-193.   
27 David Parkin and Stephen Headley (eds), Islamic prayer across the Indian Ocean: inside and outside the mosque 
(Routledge, Oxford, 2000); Kadara Swaleh, ‘The demise of religio-cultural heritage of the Swahili people of Kenya’, 
in Rocha Chimera, Mohamed Karama, Ahmed Hussein, Khalid Omar (eds), Kiswahili research and development in 
Eastern Africa (National Museums of Kenya, Mombasa, 2011), pp. 322-338.  
28 Randall Pouwels, ‘Sh. Al-Amin B. Ali Mazrui and the Islamic Modernism in East Africa’, 1875-1947, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 13, 3 (1981), pp. 329-345.   
29 Ibid. 
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interpretation of classical texts (ijtihad), so as to advance Muslim interests (maslaha) in the modern 
context.30 In this early attempt at reforming existing Islamic practice and modernizing Muslim 
public life, Sheikh Mazrui discouraged what he saw as the ‘blind’ following of religious innovation 
that was inherent in the veneration of traditional Islamic scholars and instead, asked Muslims to 
appropriate models of Western civilization (such as secular education) without veering away from 
fundamental Islamic teachings.31 While his emphasis on the Quran and the traditions of the 
Prophet, i.e. the Hadith and the Sunna, was an affront to the hegemony of traditional Sufi-Shafi 
scholars, his campaign for modernization of Islamic life was a way to prepare Muslims to compete 
favorably with Western-educated Christians. Failure to appropriate secular education (and hence 
the skills required in a modern state), Sheikh Mazrui opined, would serve to alienate Muslims in 
future.32 
  Sheikh Mazrui’s reform agenda, including his ‘prophecy’ of an imminent ‘up-country’ and 
predominantly Christian hegemony in years to come, largely went unheeded, in fact, it drew 
outright condemnation from members of the numerically larger Swahili community.33 These 
struggles over religious leadership, especially in coastal communities, reflected wider struggles of 
identity at the time. Sheikh Mazrui was a member of Mombasa’s old Arab upper class, which had 
traditionally avoided marriages with non-Arab families and as such, was perceived to have had 
little interest in local customs and social arrangements.34 Local Muslim opposition to Sheikh 
Mazrui’s intellectual campaign against local traditions and his Pan-Arab ideals were seen to have 
been a consequence of a racial-hierarchy that had had a long history by the time the British arrived 
on the East African coast.35 Despite this, Sheikh Mazrui’s ideas would re-emerge under a post-
colonial context of ‘up-country’ Christian hegemony and a Muslim retreat from Kenya’s public 
life. 
  Two distinctively Muslim political agendas – one for coastal autonomy, and another for the 
predominantly Somali and Muslim-dominated Northern Frontier District that borders Somalia to 
join, not an independent Kenya, but a ‘Greater Somalia’ – were made, and then rejected, at the 
dawn of Kenya’s independence in the early 1960s.36 Despite some concessions, such as the post-
colonial constitutional recognition of Kadhis’ courts that had had legal recognition since 1895, 
these proposals revealed, quite early enough, Muslim anxieties regarding their inclusion into a 
state that was considered ‘secular only in a nominal sense, with a political culture that is largely 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Bakari, ‘The new Ulama’, pp. 173  
32 Pouwels, ‘Sh. Al-Amin B. Ali Mazrui’, pp. 340.  
33 Interview, Kenya coast based public intellectual, Mombasa, Kenya, 24 February 2017; Interview, Lecturer, Pwani 
University and Lamu resident, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September, 2015.   
34 Pouwels, ‘Sh. Al-Amin B. Ali Mazrui’, pp. 335.   
35 Jonathan Glassman, Feasts and riot: revelry, rebellion and popular consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 
(Heinemann, Portsmouth, 1995). 
36 Hannah Whittaker, Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Kenya: a social history of the Shifta conflict, 1963-1968 
(Brill, Leiden, 2015); James Brennan, ‘Lowering the Sultan’s flag: sovereignty and decolonization in coastal 
Kenya’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 4 (2008), pp. 831-861.   
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infused with Christian language and imagery’.37 In addition, with the defeat of these proposals and 
the hegemonic status of ‘up-country’, Christian and Western-educated elites that followed, 
struggles for Islamic reform and modernization continued. A more assertive group of reformist 
scholars and preachers emerged in the years after Kenyan independence.38  
  Initially, this group was influenced by the teachings of Sheikh Abdallah Saleh Al-Farsy (1912-
1982), the first post-colonial Chief Kadhi, who had been Sheikh Mazrui’s Islamic student.39 These 
reformers, notably Harith Swaleh, Nassor Khamis, Mahmoud Msallam and Ali Shee, continued 
the campaign to reform Islamic practice and modernize Muslim public life.40 Similar to Sheikh 
Mazrui’s reformist and modernist campaign during the colonial period, these men – and they were 
all men – presented reform and modernization as a response to the post-colonial socioeconomic 
marginality of Kenyan Muslims.41 The efforts of these men would be expanded by the return to 
Kenya of graduates who had received scholarships to join leading centers of Islamic study in the 
Muslim world, in particular, Saudi-Arabia, Libya, Egypt and the Sudan – a trend that spiked from 
1979, the year of the Iranian revolution.42  
  Taking advantage of increasing Saudi-Arabian patronage (which increased so as to wade off 
Iran’s global ambitions, e.g. in spreading Shiism), Kenya’s young Muslims were gradually 
exposed to Islamic reformist ideas by influential Muslim thinkers, becoming particularly enamored 
by the ideological currents circulating in the Muslim world at the time, and especially, by a 
puritanical brand (Wahhabism) that was widely professed in Saudi-Arabia. On their return to 
Kenya during the 1980s, most of them continued to propagate these ideas.43 Their claims to 
scholarship did not only give them – young Muslims from a diverse ethnic, regional and racial 
background – social mobility, as some improved their economic status as a result, but it also gave 
them status and influence as imams and teachers.44  
  Their return also coincided with the establishment of a dense trans-local network of Islamic 
charities, study groups, and Muslim youth associations, which meant that internal Muslim debates 
about proper religious practice, akin to John Lonsdale’s debates about ‘moral ethnicity and civic 
                                                          
37 Mwakimako and Willis, Islam, politics and violence’. pp. 11.  
38 Interview, a Human rights activist and a retired education officer, Garisa, Kenya, 14 April 2016 ; Kresse, ‘Muslim 
politics’.     
39 Bakari, ‘The new Ulama’, pp. 182.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Interview, Lecturer, Pwani University and Lamu resident, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 September, 2015;   
Bakari, ‘The new Ulama’, pp. 190. 
42 Abdin Chande, ‘Radicalism and reform in East Africa’, in Nehemiah Levtzion and Randall Pouwels (eds), The 
history of Islam in Africa, (James Currey, Oxford, 2000), pp.  349-372.   
43 Bakari, ‘The new Ulama’, pp. 175.  
44 Interview, Quranic-school teacher, Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 September 2015; Interview, Islamic preacher, 
Pumwani, Nairobi, Kenya, 19 September 2015; Interview, official of Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya 
(CIPK), Mombasa, Kenya, 24 November, 2015.  
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virtue’, would become much more public and fierce in the late 1980s.45 Given that Kenya was 
headed towards the politically turbulent years of the 1990s, established authority would therefore 
receive increasing challenges from the wider Muslim public in the years that followed.46  
 
Contesting religious and political authority since the 1990s  
Muslim public opinion in the early part of the 1990s was dominated by questions around the 
establishment (and consequent denial of registration) of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK).47 
Despite the party’s claims to representing the concerns of a religious minority, the list of grievances 
they presented was distinctively secular: low representation of Muslims in government, Muslim 
discrimination by government institutions, low government investment in education and 
infrastructure in predominantly Muslim areas, amongst others.48 The proposal to establish the IPK 
had itself arrived on the backdrop of the repeal of Section 2A of Kenya’s former constitution, after 
which multiple parties other than the ruling one were allowed registration so as to contest in 
general-elections.  
 
  However, the proposal was rejected by the government, which cited the party’s religious 
character as a problem. Despite the refusal for registration, the wider context of political 
liberalization within which the party had been formed occasioned a wider increase in public 
invocations of Islam, which would be made in the years ahead not only by religious scholars and 
preachers, but by the wider Muslim public.49 The kind of Muslim activism that followed meant 
that the ‘Muslim question’, which had largely been muted since the independence years, reemerged 
in the 1990s as Muslims began to organize more assertively as ‘Muslims’ in the public arena.50 
Indeed,  a national Muslim organization had been formed in 1973, called the Supreme Council of 
Kenyan Muslims, or SUPKEM. But SUPKEM was mostly known for its close relationship with 
ruling regimes, and the organization was encouraging Muslims, in the 1970s and 1980s, to be loyal 
                                                          
45 John Lonsdale, ‘The Moral Economy of the Mau Mau: wealth, poverty and virtue in Kikuyu political thought,’ in 
John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman (eds) Unhappy valley: conflict in Kenya and Africa,’ (London: James Currey), pp. 
265-504.   
46 FGD, 10 participants from the neighbourhood of Majengo, Mombasa, Kenya, 30 June 2016; FGD, 10 participants 
from the neighbourhood of Pumwani, Nairobi, Kenya, 23 June 2016.     
47 Arye Oded, ‘Islamic extremism in Kenya: the rise and fall of Sheikh Khalid Balala’, Journal of Religion in Africa 
26, 4, (1996), pp. 406-415.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Interview, youth activist, Eastleigh, Nairobi, 7 September 2015; Interview, gender activist, Majengo, Mombasa, 7 
September 2015; Interview, county government official, youth activist and 2 university students, Garisa, Kenya, 16 
April 2016.   
50 Interview, Islamic preacher, Mombasa, 15 November 2015; Interview, Human rights activist focussing on Muslim 
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Thordsen, New Muslim activism in Kenya, (Aarhus University, unpublished M.A dissertation, 2009).    
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to the authorities, and to separate religion from politics.51 While these views would continue into 
the 1990s, challenges to SUPKEM’s claims for Muslim leadership grew.52 In numerous ‘letters to 
editors’ and opinion articles published in Kenya’s increasingly assertive newspapers, various 
individuals claiming to be representing particular strands of Muslim opinion accused SUPKEM’s 
leadership of corruption, self-aggrandizement, and for failing to unite Kenyan Muslims.53 The 
opposition to SUPKEM, best exemplified by supporters of the unregistered IPK, reflected a wider 
opposition to the religious and political establishment within the Muslim population of Kenya, 
especially the office of the Chief Kadhi and other prominent Muslims, including Muslim 
politicians at the time.54  
 
  As it became apparent that SUPKEM had lost significant monopoly in speaking on behalf of 
Kenyan Muslims, multiple Muslim voices emerged to claim the space within the public arena for 
debating the Muslim condition in Kenya. The growth of these multiple voices, and the need to 
articulate a distinctively Muslim political agenda in Kenyan politics, had not only been informed 
by the perceived failures of SUPKEM and other religious authorities, but had also been given 
renewed force by the social consequences of economic liberalization in the 1990s.55 Since 
independence, the minority Muslim population of Kenya had been distant from institutions of 
power and influence, but the cultural remoteness of the state was deepened by socioeconomic 
changes that affected the neighborhoods of Mombasa and Nairobi, and across Muslim-dominated 
Northeast Kenya in the 1990s.56 For instance, the decade saw the largest rural-urban migration in 
Kenya’s post-colonial history, which was then followed by a collapse of the formal economy and 
a decline or disappearance of public social services.57 A trend of internal migration accompanied 
a rise in social, economic and political violence, as individuals and groups struggled in defence of 
economic position against each other at one level, and against local government institutions at 
another.58 Take Mombasa for example, Kenya’s largest predominantly Muslim urban centre by 
                                                          
51 For example, Daily Nation, ‘The speech of Kassim Mwamzandi’, 7 April 1980; British Broadcasting Corporation, 
‘The speech of Supkem’s secretary, Mohamed Amana in Summary of World Broadcasts,’ 5 May 1987; The Standard, 
‘Chief Kadhi’s call during the Supkem conference,’ 11 June 1979.       
52 Ndzovu, Muslims in Kenyan politics, pp. 82; Oded, Islam and politics, pp. 22.   
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1990. It’s population of Muslims was quickly surpassed by that of ‘non-coastal’ Christians in the 
years that followed, and many years later, a poll would indicate that Mombasa comprised 40% 
Muslims and 60% Christians.59 In addition to the increased informalization of public authority that 
accompanied these socioeconomic changes – which gave advantage to politically-connected 
individuals – Muslims became increasingly aware and concerned about their marginal status in 
Kenya after 1990.60 The result was a more assertive Muslim activism, which also saw a further 
deepening of divisions amongst Muslims regarding how to address the Muslim predicament.61  
 
  In particular, the government’s refusal to register the IPK – ostensibly formed to offer a political 
solution to the socioeconomic conditions affecting Muslims – led to the registration of multiple 
Muslim organisations, all seeking to mobilize the Muslim voice in Kenya.62 However, these 
organizations, such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), the Muslim 
Consultative Council (MCC), and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), amongst others, 
immediately appeared to have much of an informal character, with affiliations to a variety of 
foreign donors, personal rivalries and mutual non-communication.63 While the establishment, from 
1997 (the year of IPK’s decisive demise) of most of these organizations is reflective of wider social 
cleavages running through the minority Muslim population of Kenya, the organizations appeared 
to be supporting a broad agenda that encouraged Muslim participation in the formal political 
process, which they argued was the most appropriate strategy to create the right conditions for the 
Muslims of Kenya.64  
 
  In addition to these organisations, and emerging from a similar political context of liberalization 
in the 1990s, were activists who chose to cast the Muslim condition of Kenya as part of a global 
systematic alienation of Muslim interests.65 For these individuals, the lack of a formal political 
platform in Kenya led to a turn to an expanding, yet informal discursive space through which they 
would debate issues affecting the Muslim public, or the Ummah.66 In this space – which involved 
new communication media and mosque platforms – many people got the opportunity to talk about 
Muslim concerns, including those who were not necessarily educated in Islamic theology.67 As a 
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Muslim human rights activist based in Mombasa aptly put it, “many who could not quote al-Buhari 
could, for instance, talk about the [American] invasion of Iraq.”68 In this way, speakers seemed to 
be dedicating much of their attention in articulating an Islamic political vision in Kenya; rather 
than conducting abstruse theological ruminations that are usually settled by reciting the Hadith in 
Arabic, as was the case with most educated Islamic reformers before 1990. Instead, these ‘new’ 
thematic concerns – which drew parallels between Kenyan Muslim grievances and issues affecting 
Muslims elsewhere – appeared to provide a widely accessible narrative of international injustice.69 
  
  At the same time, an increased use of the Internet and Cable Television coincided with the arrival 
of preachers from elsewhere in the Muslim world, especially from the Middle-East, Somalia and 
Tanzania, and a labour migration of Kenyans into the Gulf States.70 The imagined international 
community of Muslims was concretized in the minds of many Kenyan Muslims through these 
technological advances and migratory movements.71 Speakers were becoming explicitly radical 
and increasingly anti-American, with films, photographs, and tapes of recorded speeches 
appearing on the streets of major urban centers in Kenya that were encouraging Kenyan Muslims 
to see themselves as part of a global struggle.72 While some of the material that was being 
circulated through these new channels did not glorify violence, some of it did, as more attention 
was given to global currents.73 Despite striking a chord with common sentiments in Kenya that 
viewed Islamism as having non-Kenyan roots, Moustapha Hassouna, who was once a lecturer of 
security studies at the University of Nairobi, offered a more nuanced understanding of the changing 
trends in Muslim activism during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Speaking to a reporter for the 
Christian Science Monitor in 2002, Hassouna stated that “Kenyans do not have the wherewithal, 
nor the character, to start up their own homegrown international terror organization, but [Kenyan] 
Muslims are becoming more ‘radical or political in their outlook, and I can see their sympathies 
being used by outside terror interests.”74 A preacher at Masjid Sakina in Mombasa added, that 
“during that time [1998-2002] imams begun preaching about injustices done to their brothers in 
Afghanistan and Palestine…[…] I was young, but I remember watching those CNN reports on the 
Middle-East, and the bombs, and we thought this was all because those countries were Muslim.”75 
Asked whether Islamist ideas had gained traction in Muslim-dominated neighborhoods in the early 
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2000s, a Muslim rights activist responded as follows, “when the Islamist ideology was introduced 
to mostly urban, Muslim-dominated and poor neighborhoods, it really took off and gained traction 
with the locals because of its religious posturing. Most youth may not have understood the 
ideology but they saw themselves as part of a bigger community. They got carried away very 
fast”.76 It was these trends, amongst others discussed below, that would come to provide the 
ideological infrastructure for the manifestation of an Islamist ideology in the decade that 
followed.77 
 
Responses to Muslim activism by the state and the wider Christian public 
 
The debate, regarding whether to advance Muslim interests in Kenya through formal political 
channels or to seek redress through violent and/or non-violent transnational strategies, dominated 
Muslim politics in Kenya in the years after the demise of the IPK – during which Kenya’s long 
constitutional review process (between 2000 and 2010) took place. It was during this time that a 
section of the Christian clergy and Muslim leaders were also divided, especially over the issue of 
the legal recognition of Kadhis’ courts within Kenyan law.78 Parallel to the latter was the 
inauguration of a new security regime aimed at countering the threat of terrorism, a development 
that would come to dominate Muslim-state relations for much of the period after two suicide 
bombings by a local cell of Al-Qaeda (in 1998 and 2002) that led to destruction of property at 
locally unprecedented levels, including the loss of over 200 lives.79 The sum effect of these trends 
– state responses to terrorism and Christian public reactions to Muslim activism – was a hardening 
of the differences in Muslim public opinion that had begun taking shape in the late 1990s as 
discussed above. The result was the creation of a suitable discursive environment for the 
articulation of an Islamist ideology, which emerged to seek wider relevance within Kenya’s on-
going internal struggles, especially those that involved the future political direction of Kenyan 
Muslims.  
 
  After the investigations and subsequent court hearings that followed the Al-Qaeda attacks in 
Kenya revealed that Kenyan nationals were involved, an alliance emerged, between the interests 
of Kenyan political elites and those of Western governments, in countering the threat of ‘global 
terrorism’.80 Western funding was used to build the physical infrastructure for countering terrorism 
in Kenya, but the nature in which the Kenyan government implemented its counter-terrorist 
policies was perceived by a majority of the respondents as the latest example of state hostility 
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towards Muslim activism, a hostility that had origins in the decolonization period.81 In this way, 
common perceptions regarding Kenya’s minority Muslim population that view them as ‘outsiders’ 
were entwined with real policy responses to countering terrorism. Following from this precedent, 
arbitrary and mass scale arrests would be conducted in Muslim dominated neighbourhoods of 
Mombasa and Nairobi, including the rendition of terrorism suspects, most of whom were Somali, 
Arab and Swahili, to foreign countries.82 The result, according to a long-time resident of the 
Muslim-dominated neighbourhood of Majengo in Mombasa, is that “we don’t trust anyone, not 
the government, not the police, not outsiders”.83 Despite this, the conceptualisation of Islamist 
violence as extrinsic to Kenyan politics proceeded to influencing dominant state perspectives 
regarding the presence of Somali refugees, and as a result, the government has continued to invoke 
threats to national security while threatening to close-down refugee camps – threats that would 
nonetheless be softened with pledges for more funding by Western governments.84 The sum of 
these policy actions – all of which were aimed at salvaging Kenya’s international image by 
presenting the problem of Islamist violence as distinctively non-Kenyan –  came when Kenya 
decided to intervene militarily in Southern Somalia in late 2011.85 
 
  The spectre of international terrorism, best symbolised by the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda 
attacks in the United States, did not only entrench state suspicions towards Muslim activism in 
Kenya, but it also contributed to a number of developments that would come to draw a wedge 
between a section of the Christian clergy and Muslim leaders: a wedge that would be written on 
the canvas of constitutional review between 2000 and 2010.86 The bone of contention was the 
inclusion of the Kadhis’ Courts in what would become a new constitution of Kenya. The courts 
had emerged out of constitutional concessions made to supporters of ‘coastal autonomy’ at the 
dawn of Kenya’s independence, and had existed since then as part of the Judiciary so as to 
adjudicate on Islamic Law of personal status when it comes to issues of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance involving parties that both profess the Islamic religion.87 Therefore, when Muslim 
leaders, preachers, and activists teamed up with members of the Christian clergy to push for 
constitutional reform in the late 1990s, the hope was that this would not only curtail the power of 
the political establishment, but that it will also allow for the reform of the Kadhis’ courts; by 
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expanding their mandate, standardizing their procedures and modernizing their practice.88 
However, after the first constitutional report by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC) enhanced the position of the Kadhis’ courts – by expanding their mandate to include small 
commercial claims between Muslims, and providing for a Kadhis’ court of appeal –  a group of 
about 40 evangelical and Pentecostal churches calling itself the ‘Kenya Church’ contested the 
status enjoyed by the Kadhis’ courts in the constitution.89 These Christian leaders articulated a set 
of interrelated claims: that it was unfair for Christian taxpayers to pay for the courts, that the courts 
privileged Islam over other religions, that they were the first step into introducing an Islamic state 
in Kenya.90 
 
  Despite the fact that the Kadhis courts were eventually enshrined in the 2010 constitution, which 
had received the popular vote at a referendum during the same year, the opposition to the Kadhis 
courts by a broad-section of the Christian leadership was consistent throughout the two rounds of 
constitutional review, i.e. 2000-2005 and 2009-2010. As illustrated by observers of this debate, 
such as Hassan Mwakimako and Anne Cussac, the Kadhis’ courts controversy degenerated into a 
flurry of accusations and rumour, reflecting the fears, rather than objectivity, of most of its main 
protagonists.91 Routinely mentioned was the threat of international terrorism, and perhaps, fear of 
what some saw as an Islamic resurgence in Kenya and beyond.92  But to most Muslim leaders, this 
debate was a manifestation of a wider ‘Pentecostalisation’ of Kenyan society, through which 
Christian religious symbols, imagery, and language were rapidly entering the domain of public 
life.93 This form of Christianity –  an overtly depoliticised Christian Pentecostal culture that largely 
focuses on a theology of personal transformation – was quickly replacing the culture of political 
activism that had marked the established churches (mainly Catholic and Protestant) in the 1990s.94 
Instead, the emerging public hostility to Islam by evangelical and Pentecostal churches was 
entwined with the churches’ close involvement in the reproduction of the political order, steeped 
in its ethos of patronage and the open display of the material trappings of success as a reward for 
faith.95 In this way, Christianity in general was becoming closely associated with the dominant 
political culture of the state, while Islam would come to provide the language for opposing the 
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status-quo, especially in articulating coastal and Somali grievances against the government.96 
Perhaps most significantly, the Kadhis courts debate came to complicate struggles within the 
Muslim community for finding a common voice towards the redressing of Muslim grievances.  
 
  In fact, a group of Muslim activists depicted the Kadhis’ courts debate and the experience of 
counter-terrorism as local examples of Muslim victimization; which increased their skepticism of 
the idea that Muslim interests could be advanced through formal political processes.97 Aboud Rogo 
Mohamed (1968-2012), a leading IPK activist in the 1990s – he was arrested, charged and 
acquitted in connection to the 28 November 2002 suicide attack – quickly emerged as the 
ideological leader of the latter group of activists.98 From 2005, after his acquittal, Rogo attempted, 
with considerable success, to mobilize Muslim public opinion against Muslim politicians, religious 
leaders and scholars who were enthusiastic about constitutionalism, elections and democracy as a 
means of promoting Muslim interests.99 Issuing a sermon during the Eid celebrations of 2006 at 
Tononoka grounds in Mombasa, Rogo stated that “the role of Muslims is to follow the example of 
the Prophet…[…] The Sunnah will not be complete if Muslims in Kenya will not join the defensive 
Jihad that is being wedged by our brothers and sisters in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Palestine.”100 Other preachers, such as Samir Khan (1971-2012), who, like Rogo, preached in the 
Majengo neighborhood of Mombasa; Hassaan Mahad Omar (1979-present), who preached in the 
Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi; and Ahmed Iman Ali (1972-present), who preached at the 
Pumwani Riyadha Mosque neighboring Eastleigh, followed Rogo in drawing parallels between 
Kenyan Muslim grievances and global trends affecting the Muslim public.  
 
  These activists cum preachers produced and circulated their own alternative sources of 
information, through newsletters such as the defunct ‘Al-Misbah’ that was published by the 
Muslim Youth Center based at the relatively wealthier Pumwani Riyadha mosque, and its 
successor publication ‘Gaidi Mtaani’, an online magazine published by Al-Shabaab’s media 
division but dedicated to a Kenyan audience.101 Their speeches, recorded on tape, DvD’s, and 
posted on YouTube, received faster and wider levels of circulation than would have been possible 
in the early to mid-1990s.102 In addition to the use of this alternative multi-media platform, they 
used rents gathered from mosque property, especially from the Pumwani Riyadha mosque, to fund 
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their trips in other mosques in Nairobi, on the coast, and further up-country.103 During sermons, a 
central discursive thread involved the location of religious justifications for Muslim 
disengagement with the formal political process and engagement in religious military struggle.104 
The preachers invoked the ideas of Mawdoodi and Qutb, who argued that since Sharia is complete 
law, no further legislation is possible, and therefore, there was no need for an elected legislature.105  
 
  During ‘training’ lectures given to youth who responded favorably to the sermons, material 
evoking images of the global Muslim condition of oppression – the conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Yemen – was provided, including profiles of Islamist clerics and their ideologies.106 
They also invoked tenets widely considered central to Wahhabi Islam, such as al-wala' wal-bara', 
or loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslims. Inspired by popular Al-Qaeda Islamists such 
as Anwar Awlaki (1971-2011), they simplified common understandings of contemporary global 
conflicts affecting Muslims by dividing the world into black and white.107 This powerful 
distinction, between dar al-Islam, or the abode of Islam, and dar al-Harb, or the abode of non-
belief, communicated the idea that the underlying motivation for the current aggression 
experienced by Kenyan Muslims (and Muslims elsewhere in the world) was not secular, rather, it 
was motivated primarily by anti-Islamic forces that seek the annihilation of Islam as a world 
religion.108 A case in point includes video footage (currently deleted from the internet) by a 
contingent of Kenyan fighters with Al-Shabaab that attacked a number of towns and villages in 
Lamu county across the Kenya-Somalia border in June-July 2015. In the video, an attempt to 
carefully package coastal and Somali grievances against the Kenyan state as evidence of a 
systematic alienation of Muslim interests in Kenya was made.109 In particular, reference was made 
to state responses to an insurgency in Northeast Kenya in the 1960s commonly known as Shifta; 
the perceived loss of coastal (described in the video as Muslim) land to Christian ‘outsiders’; the 
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alleged state ‘massacres’ of Kenyan Somalis in the Northeast region in the 1980s; the arrests, 
alleged torture, and unresolved murders of Muslim clerics; and a 2014 security operation in the 
Nairobi neighborhood of Eastleigh dominated by Somalis that was reportedly marked by serious 
human rights violations.110 In sum, through such simplifying, and yet productive language, Kenyan 
Islamists were proposing their own solution to the Muslim predicament: the establishment of an 
Islamic state through which Islam would end its widely perceived marginality, and where ‘proper’ 
Islamic practice would be enforced through the strict adoption of Sharia Law.111  
 
  However, most of Kenya’s leading purveyors of a violent Islamist ideology, including Aboud 
Rogo, were murdered between 2012 and 2014 in a series of targeted killings – or as part of what 
is widely believed to have been an operation carried out by state security agents – after which the 
administration led swoops into the mosques the preachers had exercised control, and later 
supervised the selection of new mosque committees.112 The motivations for participating in 
Islamist violence by these individuals has been the subject of intense debate amongst scholars who 
have examined a host of socio-economic conditions and psychosocial factors.113 Indeed, a number 
of studies have found that reasons for joining Islamist movements are diverse and varied, and that 
ideology alone might not offer substantial explanations for involvement in Islamist violence.114 
Despite this observation, it is important to note that Islamist movements invest heavily in 
presenting themselves as driven primarily by Islamist objectives, and that this is crucial to their 
recruitment strategies. Stig Jarle Hansen, in his examination of Al-Shabaab recruitment strategies 
in Somalia, submitted that motives for joining Al-Shabaab are more often than not highly varied, 
but that they usually include a quest for justice through Sharia legislation, and an idea of ‘defensive 
or offensive jihad.’115 This way of understanding the world is itself empowering. Membership can 
be compared to a conversion process, which can be considered a central benefit – more than access 
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  Since 2014, open invocations of Islamist ideas in public have reduced in Kenya, in fact, they have 
almost ground to a halt. But this has been accompanied by an increased use of digital media for 
the articulation of an Islamist ideology and expressions of support for Islamist violence.116 
Through these channels, Kenyan Islamists have not only attempted to continue to mobilize their 
co-nationals for the purposes of waging Islamist violence, but they have also continued to pay 
attention to Kenyan political struggles, inserting, as they have always done, an Islamist ideology 
within Kenya’s public discourse.117  
 
  Existing analytical frameworks, which focus on the combination of socioeconomic conditions 
and psychosocial factors so as to understand why certain individuals perpetrate ideologically 
inspired forms of violence are important, but the historical evolution, and the continued salience 
of an Islamist ideology in Kenya’s public discourse requires a distinct examination, as has been 
exemplified in this article.  The example of Kenya has shown that Islamist ideologies are inspired, 
both by the rise of a global narrative of Muslim victimization, especially since the 1990s, and by 
local Muslim experiences. In particular, the intellectual genealogies of an Islamist ideology in 
Kenya are found within contending visions amongst Kenyan Muslims regarding how to address 
the Muslim condition in a Christian dominated country.  
 
  At the center of this article’s main argument is that Islamist politics, despite the violence that they 
propagate, are in Kenya (and beyond), not an aberration to Muslim politics, but are part of the 
main strands of Islamic political thought since the twentieth century. In sum, Islamism arises out 
of internal debates amongst the Muslim public regarding the public good and civic virtue, 
including how to advance Muslim interests more widely. However, the article submits that the 
latter is not enough, and that divisions amongst Kenyan Muslims regarding the prospects of their 
future political direction have been worsened by responses to Muslim activism by the state and the 
wider Christian public. The article has shown that through the growth of Pentecostal hostility to 
Islam, as shown through the Kadhis’ courts debate, and the inauguration of a counter-terrorist 
strategy that entwines with common perceptions that regard Muslims as ‘outsiders’, an Islamist 
ideology with historical antecedents in the 1990s and before has emerged; and has since sought 
for itself wider relevance within Kenya’s public discourse. Following from these observations, the 
conclusion is that Islamist politics – in Kenya and elsewhere – are more often than not the result 
of local histories as much as they are part of a global Muslim ‘victimization’ narrative.  
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